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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  authors  designed  a risk-based  approach  to  the  selection  of poultry  ﬂocks  to be  sam-
pled  in  order  to further  improve  the  sensitivity  of  avian  inﬂuenza  (AI) active  surveillance
programme  in  Cuba.  The  study  focused  on the  western  region  of  Cuba,  which  harbours
nearly  70%  of national  poultry  holdings  and  comprise  several  wetlands  where  migratory
waterfowl  settle  (migratory  waterfowl  settlements  – MWS).  The  model  took  into  account
the  potential  risk  of  commercial  poultry  farms  in western  Cuba  contracting  from  migratory
waterfowl  of  the orders  Anseriformes  and  Charadriiformes  through  dispersion  for  pasturing
of migratory  birds  around  the  MWS.  We  computed  spatial  risk  index  by geographical  anal-
ysis with  Python  scripts  in  ESRI® ArcGIS  10 on  data  projected  in  the  reference  system  NAD
1927–UTM17.  Farms  located  closer  to MWS  had  the highest  values  for the risk indicator
pj and  in total  31  farms  were  chosen  for targeted  surveillance  during  the  risk  period.  The
authors  proposed  to  start  active  surveillance  in  the  study  area  3 weeks  after the onset  of
Anseriformes  migration,  with  additional  sampling  repeated  twice  in  the same  selected  poul-
try farms  at  15  days  interval  (Comin  et  al., 2012;  EFSA,  2008)  to cover  the  whole  migration
season.  In this  way,  the  antibody  detectability  would  be favoured  in  case  of either  a pos-
terior  AI introduction  or enhancement  of  a previous  seroprevalence  under  the sensitivity
level.  The  model  identiﬁed  the areas  with  higher  risk  for AIV  introduction  from  MW, aiming
at selecting  poultry  premises  for the  application  of  risk-based  surveillance.  Given  the  infre-
quency  of  HPAI  introduction  into  domestic  poultry  populations  and  the  relative  paucity  of
occurrences  of  LPAI  epidemics,  the evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of  this  approach  would
require  its  application  for  several  migration  seasons  to allow  the  collection  of sufﬁcient
reliable  data.
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1. IntroductionUntil 1996, highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI)
viruses belonging to serotypes H5 and H7 viruses were suc-
cessfully eradicated or failed to persist in nature (Salomon
and Webster, 2009). However, avian inﬂuenza (AI) has
ss article under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/
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greatly enhanced its signiﬁcance in the last years. It has
been calculated that the impact of AI on the world-wide
poultry industry from 1999 to 2004 (Capua and Alexander,
2004) involved more than 200 million animals. Today, it is
unknown whether the ecology of these viruses has changed
and whether highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses continue to
be propagated in domestic or wild bird reservoirs.
Furthermore, some avian inﬂuenza virus (AIV) can infect
humans with serious public health implications (WHO,
2013, 2014). Changes in agricultural practices, enhanced
animal health surveillance, and/or virus evolution may
have contributed to the apparent increase in animal
inﬂuenza outbreaks reported in recent times; that turns
AI into an increasing concern for veterinarians worldwide
(Ducatez et al., 2008).
The surveillance and control of AI have historically
focused on the detection and eradication of infections due
to HPAI viruses in poultry populations. However, reports
of low pathogenicity avian inﬂuenza (LPAI) viruses in poul-
try are recurrent, with outbreaks annually affecting several
countries (WAHIS, 2014). Most of AI infections in poul-
try are caused by LPAI virus strains, which may  belong
to any serotype, including H5 and H7. These H5 or H7
LPAI viruses may  circulate causing unnoticeable clinical
signs, unless they mutate into HPAI viruses (Alexander and
Brown, 2009). Therefore the recurrence of LPAI virus cir-
culation is a constant risk to poultry industries throughout
the world.
Various approaches have been applied for the diagno-
sis of AI (OIE, 2008), including techniques for the detection
of the virus, its genome, antigens or antibodies. However,
the antibodies to AIV, as evidence of infection, often per-
sist for the entire production life of the infected poultry
(Fouchier et al., 2003), allowing a high opportunity for
long-term diagnosis. The detection of a signiﬁcant increase
of antibody titre allows an opportunity for early war-
ning. Consequently, antibody detection to LPAI viruses is
compulsory for several countries, e.g. in the EU countries
(European Commission, 2007, 2009).
The control and eradication of AI are based on passive
and active surveillance, disease notiﬁcation, prevention of
possible contacts, biosecurity measures, and movement
restriction of live birds, poultry products, by-products and
potentially infective material, and depopulation of infected
farms (OIE, 2013). However, when timely disease detec-
tion fails, the stamping out as a key control measure could
become ineffective because the virus could be already seri-
ously disseminated into vast poultry populations. In such
cases, the economical consequences of the outbreak could
be devastating.
Wild waterfowl (particularly ducks, geese, swans,
gulls and shorebirds) are considered the original source
of all AIV known subtypes (Munster et al., 2007). Hence
the active surveillance, aimed at early detection of the
disease, in several countries or regions, has included the
sampling of wild bird (Burns et al., 2012; Iglesias et al.,
2010). However, wild birds are not well suited for active
surveillance for a number of reasons. AI virus in wild
waterfowl shows a seasonal prevalence, a very variable
pattern, which can vary over time and between locations
within a species (Olsen et al., 2006; Figuerola et al., 2007;edicine 116 (2014) 161–167
Hill et al., 2012). It is, therefore, difﬁcult to make an initial
assessment of the most important species to target on
the basis of virus detection alone, which demands high
sampling intensity for detecting viruses.
Furthermore, sampling of wild birds is a labour-
intensive, costly, and time-consuming task that has not
been exempted from discussion at the decision-making
level in the European Union and other regions affected by
the disease (Martinez et al., 2011). The detection of viruses
in migrating birds does not necessarily mean that these
viruses have been, or will be, successfully introduced into
a new geographic area (Martin et al., 2009) and, conse-
quently, resident waterfowl could be a best target to assess
the establishment of AI in a geographical area. However,
sampling and testing of wild birds is not required by the
Terrestrial Animal Health Code to declare a country, zone
or compartment free from AI (OIE, 2013).
The design of surveillance programmes has to be
carefully planned, taking into consideration the local epi-
demiological and ecological conditions, the areas where
migrating waterfowl transit and settle (Miller et al., 2009;
OIE, 2013; U.S., 2007, 2008), and social and economic condi-
tions (Alfonso et al., 2008; Fiebig, 2011; Martin et al., 2011;
Stärk et al., 2006).
The geographical location of Cuba makes this island an
important site along bird migration routes for resting or
wintering (Blanco, 2006) (Fig. 1).
The Cuban poultry population susceptible to AIV com-
prises 14 million of poultry, predominantly reared for egg
production, which constitute an important source of pro-
teins of animal origin for residents.
People living in rural areas of Cuba raise poultry, mainly
for own consumption rather than for commercial pur-
poses. Details of the structure of Cuban poultry farming are
reported in the Supplementary Document 1. In summary,
88% of Cuban poultry belong to commercial farms while
the rest of the poultry rearing has a low average density
(around 17.4 birds/km2).
Cuban AI surveillance programme focuses on determin-
ing either the evidence or the presence of infections by
subtypes H5 and H7, as those of main concern for poul-
try due to its ability to become highly pathogenic after
transmission to alternative hosts (Martin et al., 2009). This
approach is in agreement with the chapter on AI of the Ter-
restrial Animal Health Code (OIE, 2013). Currently, the AI
surveillance in Cuba is based on a passive and an active
component.
The passive surveillance is usually the most effective
for early detection of exotic diseases with severe clinical
forms, such as the HPAI. It is, however, less effective in
detecting the LPAI strains and it requires laboratory con-
ﬁrmation and typing of the virus strain responsible for
the outbreak. The active component is based on serol-
ogy by inhibition of hemagglutination assay (IHA), which
is designed to be able to detect at least a prevalence
of 5% AI infected holdings, with 30% infected animals
within an infected holding (IMV, 2006). These values of
target prevalence can lead to missing the presence of
infection or delay in its detection, depending on the dynam-
ics of the infection in the population (Gonzales et al.,
2010). However, the sensitivity of active surveillance can
E. Ferrer et al. / Preventive Veterinary Medicine 116 (2014) 161–167 163


























eize  of the points locating the wetlands is proportional to the number of w
e improved using a risk-based surveillance (Cameron,
012; Salman, 2003; Thrusﬁeld, 2005). This, in the case
f AI can be implemented through a risk-based selec-
ion of poultry farms to be surveyed, and through the
oncentration of surveillance activities during the period
t risk for AI introduction, i.e. during waterfowl migra-
ion.
Aim of this paper is to describe the design of the risk-
ased surveillance and the criteria used to choose which
oultry ﬂocks have to be surveyed.
. Materials and methods
.1. Study area
The study area is the western region of Cuba. This region
ncludes ﬁve provinces named Pinar del Río, Artemisa,
ayabeque, La Habana, Matanzas, and Isla de la Juven-
ud (Fig. 1). It covers nearly 29% of the country surface
nd harbours approximately 70% of the poultry commer-
ial holdings of Cuba. In this area, the consequences of a
ossible AI introduction would be more devastating than
lsewhere in Cuba, as mentioned by Rutten et al. (2012) for
ones of high poultry concentration.
This geographical area contains several wetland areas
Fig. 1), including the largest one of the Caribbean region,
iénaga de Lanier y Sur de la Isla de la Juventud (RAM-
AR http://ramsar.wetlands.org/), which harbours several
aterfowl species implicated as AIV reservoir (Acosta and
ugica, 2006; Blanco, 2006; Munster et al., 2007; Olsen
t al., 2006).l transiting during migration.
2.2. Source of data
2.2.1. Poultry data
“Location” (geographical coordinates) and “census” data
from each of the 300 poultry farms registered in the west-
ern region of Cuba were obtained from the National Poultry
Register and National Veterinary Service. Backyard poultry
are not included. For each farm, information on biosecu-
rity were also collected, focusing on inadequate anti-bird
netting or drinking water supply accessible by wild
birds.
The 300 commercial poultry farms in the census used in
this study (dark and light dots in Fig. 2 and Fig. s3 in sup-
plementary material) are located in the central part of the
regions of Pinar del Río, Artemisa, Mayabeque, Matanzas,
and widely distributed in La Habana province facing the
northern coast. In the island ‘Isla de la Juventud’, poultry
farms are located in the northern part, being the southern
part of a national park.
2.2.2. Migratory waterfowl data
Data on the abundance of wild birds belonging to the
orders of Anseriformes and Charadriiformes in the western
part of Cuba, have been described in previous ornithologi-
cal studies (Acosta and Mugica, 2006; Blanco, 2006). Data
used in this study have been obtained from these previous
studies and summarised in Table 1.
2.3. Statistical analysis2.3.1. Descriptive statistics
For each wetland, the mean of the number of migratory
waterfowl transiting during migration was  associated to
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aterfowFig. 2. Risk map  of introduction of avian inﬂuenza through migratory w
selected farms (light dots) for active surveillance programme.
the coordinates of the centroid of the wetland. Data from
Guberti (2006) on the frequency distribution of displace-
ment distances have been used to model the displacement
of migratory waterfowl around the wetlands for pastur-
ing. An inverse distance function was regressed on Guberti
(2006) raw data and then rescaled to 0–10 km to adapt
the European data to Cuban situation. Ten kilometres have
been considered the maximum range of daily movement
of wild birds for pasturing around the arrival settlement in
the Cuban ecological system (Blanco, 2006). The probabil-
ity of pasturing at larger distances was considered very low
or negligible.
Table 1
Migratory waterfowl settlements in the Western part of Cuba: location, abundan
formes,  Acosta and Mugica, 2006) associated to avian inﬂuenza transmission.
Progressive
number
Province Name of the setting Setting
position
Longitude W La
1 Matanzas Amarillas −80,54,14 
2  Las Salinas, C. Zapata −81,14,19 
3  Península de Hicacos −81,10,59 
4  Salinas de Bidos −80,44,00 
5  Laguna del Concunil −80,50,17 
6  Mayabeque Batabanó −82,17,32 
7  Artemisa Guanimar −82,33,45 
8  La Habana Triscornia −82,19,25 
9 Pinar  del Río Alonso Rojas −83,25,16 
10  Sur los Palacios −83,15,46 
11  Guanahacabibes −84,56,18 
12 I.  Juventud Ciénaga de Lanier −82,48,36 
13  Los Indios −83,00,56 ls (settlements with cross hairs dots) in the Western region of Cuba and
2.3.2. Spatial model
For each migratory waterfowl settlement, the daily pas-
turing dispersal in function of the distance is:
f  (d) = 0.34063782
d
where: d is the distance in km, and with the constrain:
∀d : 0 < d < 1 f(d) = f(1)
0.34063782 is a conversion factor to rescale the inverse
distance function regressed on Guberti (2006) raw data to
the 0–10 km range relevant for the Cuban environment.
ce of wild birds from genera (Charadriiformes, Blanco, 2006, and Anseri-







22,28,53 50,000–100,000 High 29
22,12,10 50,000–100,000 High 74
23,10,59 11,000–49,000 Medium 67
23,04,18 11,000–49,000 Medium 49
23,03,48 11,000–49,000 Medium 24
22,41,16 11,000–49,000 Medium 14
22,41,27 11,000–49,000 Medium 22
23,08,28 1000–10,000 Low 33
22,16,18 50,000–100,000 High 52
22,25,47 50,000–100,000 High 52
21,53,24 1000–10,000 Low 55
21,35,45 11,000–49,000 Medium 29



















































is a moderate to low level of poultry and poultry prod-E. Ferrer et al. / Preventive Vet
A raster of 1 km × 1 km spatial resolution has been cre-
ted in which for each pixel, the risk posed by waterfowl




f (dj,i) × bi × ˛i
here:i = serial number of wetlands i = 1, . . .,
2;dj,i = Euclidean distance of pixel j from the wet-
and i;bi = mean number of wild waterfowl passing
hrough the wetland i during the migration period
Table 1);˛i = multiplication factor for the effective pas-
uring area available to migratory birds, calculated as the
atio between the area of dry land in 10 km buffer around
he waterfowl settlement and the area of a circle of 10 km
adius.
The factor ˛i takes into account the location of the
igratory waterfowl settlements, often very close to the
uban coastline. In this case, the bird population will spread
ver the dry land only, so the density has been rescaled. The
igratory waterfowl (MW)  settlements reported in West-
rn part of Cuba are 13 (Table 1) but that in Peninsula de
icacos (Matanzas province) was excluded from the anal-
sis as it is in a very thin and long peninsula and is in a
ouristic area (Acosta and Mugica, 2006). The geographical
nalysis has been performed using Python scripts in ESRI®
rcGIS 10, on data projected in the reference system NAD
927–UTM 17.
.4. Selection criteria
The selection of farms to be sampled throughout active
urveillance, during seasonal waterfowl migration, was
ased on the index resulting from statistical analysis, which
onsidered proximity to the migratory waterfowl settle-
ent and density of MW.  The values of the index pj in each
ixel have been normalised between 0 and 1. The risk for
ach farm, based on its location, was considered propor-
ional to the value of pj in the pixel corresponding to the
entroid of the poultry farm. Any farm with an index (pj)
igher than 0.25 has been selected to be surveyed.
The aim of this risk-based surveillance system was
o improve the sensitivity of surveillance for incursions
f avian inﬂuenza (AI) in Cuba. In order to increase the
hances and the timeliness of detection of possible incur-
ions, the choice of farms to be included in the system
as based on their vulnerability. Therefore, the presence
f two other vulnerability factors, besides the exposition
o migratory waterfowl was considered: the presence of
1) inadequate anti-bird netting or (2) drinking water sup-
ly from sources exposed to the contact with wild birds.
he presence of either of these two biosecurity ﬂaws was
onsidered an ancillary criterion since in the absence of
nfection in MW,  they would have been unable to trig-
er an outbreak. Their intended use was to provide further
nformation for the selection of farms to survey in case of
idespread ties in the scoring determined by the proximity
ith wetlands (index pj).edicine 116 (2014) 161–167 165
3. Results
3.1. Risk distribution pattern
The geographical distribution of the index pj (Fig. 2 and
Fig. s3 in supplementary material) shows that the highest
risk of introduction of AI is concentrated predominantly
along the southern coastline of the study area, where most
of wetlands with largest values of MW census are located.
The farms located closer to MW settlements had the
highest values for the risk indicator pj. Those with a pj value
greater than 0.25 were chosen for targeted surveillance
during the risk period. There were no ties in the distribution
of pj values; therefore the selection of farms for risk-based
surveillance did not make use of the two ancillary criteria
on biosecurity.
3.2. Active surveillance strategy
According to selection criteria, 28 poultry farms were
chosen. These did not include any in Havana province nor
in the Isla de la Juventud municipality because the value
of the risk indicator was  below the threshold criterion in
these locations (<0.25). Since these areas are densely pop-
ulated, a possible introduction of AI could have signiﬁcant
consequences for public health, therefore 3 more farms
were added from these provinces to the selected poultry
ﬂocks. They were chosen on the basis of their risk value,
close or immediately below 0.25. Thus, the target poultry
farms to be sampled were 31 (identiﬁed in Fig. 2 and Fig.
s3 in supplementary material with light dots).
4. Discussion
The risk-based surveillance is characterised by the
selection for sampling of populations or subpopulations
where the disease presence is more likely and where prior
risk factors exist (Cameron, 2012; Salman, 2003; Thrusﬁeld,
2005). This may  increase the probability of diseases detec-
tion. This type of monitoring is also used to document the
absence of a disease in a population with a high degree of
conﬁdence (Salman, 2003).
Several risk factors are considered relevant as risk of
AI transmission to poultry (Iglesias et al., 2010). In areas
where the AI is exotic, the most relevant risk factors to
be considered are those relating to the introduction of
the infection. The main sources of infection for a free
poultry population are migratory birds (especially water-
fowl) and the trade of animals. In the Cuban situation,
the main potential source of infection is migratory birds
and the proximity to waterfowl settlements may  enhance
the probability of contact reservoir-poultry. Also impor-
tant are breaches in biosecurity (FAO, 2008), which favour
the direct or indirect contact between migratory birds and
domestic poultry.
Concerning the other possible route of introduction of
AI, due to the water isolated condition of the country, thereuct importation, always under strict veterinary control, so
migratory waterfowl remain the most probable source of
AIV introduction.
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On the other hand, it is demonstrated that H5 and
H7 avian inﬂuenza viruses, including highly pathogenic
strains, have the ability to persist in water with wide vari-
ety of temperature and salinity for extended periods of time
(Brown et al., 2007), hence it also emphasised the impor-
tance of the poultry water intake from natural lakes or
ponds as a factor that must enhance the probability of AIV
introduction in poultry farms.
Considering that the development of HI antibodies in
detectable amounts requires at least 7 days post infec-
tion (EFSA, 2008), and the likely delay in AI transmission
from MW to poultry (Ducatez et al., 2008), the authors
proposed to start active surveillance in the study area 3
weeks after the onset of Anseriformes migration. Addition-
ally, sampling must be repeated twice in the same selected
poultry farms at 15 days interval (Comin et al., 2012; EFSA,
2008) to cover the whole migration season. In this way, the
antibody detectability would be favoured in case of either
a posterior AI introduction or enhancement of a previous
seroprevalence under the sensitivity level.
The current surveillance programme for AI in Cuba
consists of a passive component based on direct virus
detection (IMV, 2006) in clinical suspects, mainly by real-
time reverse transcription-PCR. The active component of
this programme is based on a yearly random sampling of
the 25% of poultry farm, with a within ﬂock target preva-
lence of 30% (Ferrer et al., 2013). However, depending on
the dynamics of infection in the affected holding (Gonzales
et al., 2010) and the subsequent transmission between
farms, the early detection may  not be very efﬁcient. It is
expected that complementing the existing active surveil-
lance with the targeted sampling of poultry holdings at
high risk of contact with waterfowl, during the migration
periods, would increase the chances for detecting AI intro-
duction.
In Cuba as in several American countries, rice ﬁelds are
important for water birds (Acosta et al., 2010; Mugica et al.,
2006). However, rice cultivation shows seasonality and the
places could vary according to land uses; therefore further
studies are required to establish its importance relative to
wetland for the transit and resting of MW during migration
seasons. Anyway, considering that rice cultivation in the
study region is mainly concentrated in the south (Martin
et al., 2009) it can be hypothesised that the inclusion of rice
padding in the model would lead to minor modiﬁcations of
the risk map  for AI introduction.
This work also considered commercial poultry farms for
sampling as sentinels instead of backyard poultry during
targeted surveillance. The role of backyard poultry in the
spread of the AI is disputed according to several consider-
ation of population size and breeds (Goutard et al., 2012).
Backyard poultry are important in Asian countries in which
they represent over 80% of the poultry population (Lee
et al., 2008; Sedyaningsih et al., 2007). In Cuba, backyard
poultry represent only 12% of the total poultry popula-
tion. In densely populated poultry area of Northern Italy,
backyard free-range farming is at high risk for introduc-
tion of avian inﬂuenza (Terregino et al., 2007), nonetheless,
Bavinck et al. (2009), demonstrated that the probability of
infection was much smaller for backyard ﬂocks than for
commercial farms in the 2003 Dutch epidemic by H7N7. Foredicine 116 (2014) 161–167
this reason and for the low proportion of backyard poul-
try in respect to the commercial farming, the risk-based
surveillance in Cuba considered only commercial poultry
industry.
5. Conclusions
The model identiﬁed the areas with higher risk for
AIV introduction from MW,  for the selection of poul-
try premises where to apply the risk-based surveillance.
Since the incursions of HPAI do not occur with a regular
frequency and several years may  elapse before the intro-
duction of the virus, the evaluation of the effectiveness
of this approach would require its application for several
migration seasons before sufﬁcient reliable data are col-
lected.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.prevetmed.2014.05.012.
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